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ABSTRACT
The cost of providing nonemergency transporta-
tion to Medicaid and other transportation-eligible
people has escalated sharply in the United States.
In response, many states have reformed their
human services transportation delivery systems. In
this paper, we assess the results of Kentucky’s com-
prehensive reform of its transit system, including
the impact on the quality of transit service for
Medicaid-eligible users. With three sources of
data—financial and other service data, a sample of
Medicaid-eligible residents, and a sample of the
transit providers—we assess the effectiveness of the
new system. The data show that patronage levels
increased dramatically under the new process,
while unit costs declined substantially. Further,
despite measures taken to increase efficiency, pas-
sengers still expressed satisfaction with the service.
We attribute these positive results to an improved
structure of accountability. The conclusion con-
tains implications for future reforms. 
INTRODUCTION
Across the United States, there is a rising demand
for transportation services for the poor, disabled,
and elderly, many of whom live in rural areas not
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served by fixed-route public transit (Bernier and
Seekins 1999). Medicaid transportation demand
and expenses, for example, have been escalating
sharply in recent years. As the population ages and
as welfare recipients are required to work, this
demand for transportation will grow apace. The
anticipated expansion in demand for transportation
services could exacerbate current financial and
other strains on the system. 
In response to this trend, many states have begun
to reform their transportation delivery systems,
especially those providing nonemergency medical
transportation, the most frequently provided type of
transportation (Raphael 1997; 2001). To be sure,
there is room for reform. Many states maintained
systems plagued with fraud and abuse as well as
poor organization and overlapping services of dif-
ferent agencies providing transportation (Raphael
2001; HCFA and NASMD 1998). But it is also pos-
sible that attempts to reform such systems will fail
to restrain costs or only do so by sacrificing the
quality of service.
In this paper, we evaluate the results of a wide-
ranging, 1998 reform of the transportation system
in Kentucky. One of our goals is to assess the possi-
bility that the reform effected cost savings through
reductions in service. The Kentucky reform package
combined two of the more popular strategies for
transportation reform—capitation and a broker sys-
tem—and did so in a uniquely comprehensive man-
ner designed to enhance the accountability of the
four main players in the system: the state, the bro-
kers, the transportation providers, and the riders.
This research assesses Kentucky’s comprehensive
approach to reform as a model for other states. Spe-
cifically, we address these questions:
1. Did reform reduce the unit cost of providing
services?
2. Did it maintain or raise the quality of service?
3. Did it reduce waste, fraud, and inefficiency?
If the reform succeeded in doing all three, then
Kentucky’s approach to building accountability into
its system may be of use to other states. We describe
the current approach to reform and then the specif-
ics of Kentucky’s transformation of its human ser-
vices transportation system. After assessing the
approach in terms of its impact on the ability of the
state to hold the providers of services accountable,
we describe the research design and data. Three pri-
mary sources of data were considered: a sample of
Medicaid-eligible Kentucky residents; a sample of
transportation providers; and financial and service
data on the number of passengers conveyed each
month, the average length of trips, and the average
cost. We also conducted interviews with 15 brokers. 
Recent Reforms
To reduce Medicaid transportation expenditures,
many states have turned to two reforms in particu-
lar—transportation brokerages and capitated rates.
These can take a variety of forms, may be combined
into one reform package, or may be applied across
an entire state or only in specific portions of it
(Raphael 2001).
Brokerages and systems of capitation have their
respective strengths and weaknesses. Under a bro-
kerage, one broker is given the responsibility of
assigning riders to providers. The broker is encour-
aged to select the most appropriate provider for a
particular rider. Brokers can monitor the providers
to eliminate waste and fraud, but their effectiveness
at doing so is dubious. Some brokers are paid a fee
for each ride they broker and some are paid a capi-
tated rate for all the potential riders in their area. 
Capitated rates are explicitly designed to encour-
age cost reduction. Brokers are given a set amount
of money for each person in a region who qualifies
for a specific type of transportation service, whether
or not the qualified person actually uses it. It seems
likely, therefore, that brokers under systems of capi-
tation will work harder to reduce costs than brokers
who are paid a fee.
Capitated rates may produce their own set of
problems. In most states, capitation is operated
through Medicaid health maintenance organiza-
tions (HMOs). As a condition of receiving a Medic-
aid contract, the HMO must provide transportation
services. This has the advantage of shifting the risk
of excessive cost to the HMO. It does, however,
present a problem associated with managed health-
care—reductions in quality or access to service.
Obviously, states do not want to reduce costs by
reducing either the quantity or quality of service. So
a means must be found to ensure that service pro-
viders continue to make appropriate, timely, and
comfortable transportation available to all who
need it.
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From the limited amount of research on some of
these reform efforts (Raphael 1997; 2001), the turn
to brokerages and capitated rates may be reducing
costs in the states. Logically, the reforms can save
money through three distinct means: 1) improve-
ments in the organization and delivery of services,
2) reductions in the amount of fraud, and 3) reduc-
tions in the quality of the service provided. 
TRANSIT DELIVERY BEFORE
AND AFTER REFORM
Kentucky’s set of state reforms is considered very
comprehensive. It divided the entire state into 16
mutually exclusive brokerages so that all transpor-
tation-eligible Kentuckians in all the state’s 120
counties had access to transportation for the first
time (Michels and Bogren 1998). It then devised a
capitation system based on the number of transpor-
tation-eligible citizens in each region. The capitated
rate per person, which varies from program to pro-
gram, is multiplied by a percentage of the potential
users to arrive at a lump sum, which is agreed on in
the contract with the broker. This places a limit on
the state’s financial liability, but it also places limits
on the broker’s capacity to pay the providers. To
remain solvent, the brokerage must avoid paying
the providers more money in total than it receives
from the state.
In addition to the Medicaid-eligible, the Human
Services Transportation Delivery Program (HSTDP)
covers most other programs with a transportation
component, including Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF), vocational rehabilitation,
and services for the blind. Each broker is allocated a
lump sum to provide transportation in its area. After
paying providers, the broker keeps the remainder.
Unlike other states with capitated rates, Kentucky
does not rely on HMOs to broker services.
The HSTDP is a significant departure from the
prior transportation delivery system. Previously,
transportation services were funded separately by
the various government transportation programs
affiliated with Medicaid, TANF, Vocational Reha-
bilitation, or the Department for the Blind. Most of
the actual transportation was provided by private
companies and in some cases by not-for-profit orga-
nizations such as Community Action Agencies. This
fragmented approach proved expensive; the cost of
providing nonemergency transportation in Ken-
tucky increased 270% between 1991 and 1998
(Planning and Technology Solutions Team 2000). 
 Before the broker program, the official policy
required a customer to access service by calling the
local Community-Based Service Office, which would
then provide a voucher to the recipient for a trip. In
reality, however, people needing transportation to a
doctor’s office, training center, hospital, or other legit-
imate destination often called a private transporta-
tion provider directly. The provider (e.g., a cab
company) determined eligibility and then conveyed
the recipient to his or her destination. Subsequently,
the provider was compensated by the state.
 By law, many other types of trips were not cov-
ered by Medicaid and other governmental pro-
grams, including those to the pharmacy and
supermarket. In general, Medicaid recipients were
allowed to obtain rides only to approved medical
facilities and TANF recipients only to approved
training facilities and work sites. For other types of
rides, riders had to pay out of pocket. It was diffi-
cult, however, for authorities to monitor the actual
services rendered, and it was feared that taxpayers
were paying for numerous unauthorized trips (e.g.,
to a pharmacy or hairdresser). 
Under the new HSTDP capitated-broker pro-
gram, the recipient calls the broker, who determines
eligibility and then assigns the rider to a transporta-
tion provider. Preauthorization is required for the
service rendered, and the broker pays the provider
for the specific service authorized. 
Under the new HSTDP broker program, it is in
the brokers’ monetary interest to keep the payments
to their transportation providers as small as possi-
ble. Cost control can be accomplished in a variety of
legitimate ways: 1) by reducing the incidence of pay-
ment for unauthorized rides, 2) by carrying more
than one rider on a specific trip, and 3) by reducing
the length of rides. The brokers are also rewarded
for minimizing payment to providers for trips to
unauthorized destinations, such as the drugstore
and supermarket.
These changes in the structure of financial incen-
tives, though in theory an improvement, also set up
some possible disincentives. Since the brokers receive
a lump sum payment, they may attempt to make
ends meet by limiting the number of legitimate trips
outright or by filling the vehicle, thus increasing pas-
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sengers’ ride time or time spent waiting to be picked
up while additional passengers are picked up. It is
therefore possible that financial savings may be pur-
chased at the price of rider satisfaction.
STRUCTURE OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
Most definitions of accountability focus on its
essential characteristic: answerability (Rosen 1998;
Miller 1991; O’Connell et al. 1990; Dwivedi and
Jabbra 1989; Caiden 1989; Romzek and Dubnick
1987; Frink and Ferris 1998). 
Building accountability into government institu-
tions is no easy task, as an individual or entity can
be answerable to more than one party and for more
than one task. All these can conflict in various ways.
For example, accountability to customers for the
quality of service can conflict with accountability to
taxpayers for cost-effectiveness.
Under the old system for transportation, there
appeared to be a breakdown in the structure of
accountability. Working from a variety of offices in
the state capital, state agencies were ill-positioned to
monitor and regulate the providers. As a result,
transportation providers seemed to be giving unau-
thorized rides to customers and/or charging for
more miles than necessary (Michels and Bogren
1998). Although the customers were happy with the
services paid for by the government, many of these
services were inappropriate.
The capitated broker system was designed to
increase accountability and alleviate these problems.
Under this system, each broker is responsible for
rides provided in a specific region. Presumably, to
keep expenditures below the lump sum established
by the system of capitated payments, brokers are
motivated to maximize the efficiency of service
delivery in their region. 
Accountability cannot be guaranteed, however.
There is always the possibility that the broker and
provider will cut corners in ways that lower the
quality of service. For that reason, Kentucky’s
reform also calls for a mechanism for transit users
to register complaints with their brokers and/or the
state. The state keeps a record of these complaints,
and they can lead to a loss of contract in future
years. Thus, the brokers can be held accountable by
the state for lapses in service. Figure 1 shows the
four principle players in the accountability struc-
ture: brokers, providers, riders, and the state. The
state holds brokers accountable through the con-
tract to broker all rides in a region in return for the
capitated payment. This motivates brokers to mini-
mize costs. Brokers in turn hold riders and providers
accountable by determining rider eligibility and
assigning riders to a provider. Brokers are motivated
to eliminate all forms of waste and fraud in order to
minimize their expenditures. With broker payments
limited to eligible trips only, providers will be moti-
vated to deny ineligible trips to riders. Riders, for
their part, will hold the state and the brokers
accountable by filing complaints about service qual-
ity, which will motivate brokers to maintain the
quality of service and access to care. 
In another phase of this research, the 15 active
HSTDP brokers were interviewed (a lawsuit over
which company would broker the 16th region
delayed its entry into the program). The brokers indi-
cated much concern for the needs of the users: several
reported a policy of routine spot checks of their pro-
viders to see that pickups were punctual; most
reported a policy of inspecting the providers’ vehicles
to see that they were up to the safety codes. Brokers
also indicated that the complaint system was work-
ing. Users of the services had access to both the state
and their regional broker should they have cause for
concerns regarding the system. The positive state-
ments of the brokers notwithstanding, there is still a
chance that the broker system may not be providing
satisfactory service. A complete assessment of the
new system requires, therefore, a dual focus: one on
costs; the other on customer satisfaction. 
Brokers
Providers
State
Riders
Complain 
  to state
Assign 
 riders 
  and 
monitor
Pays brokers a lump sum for service
Determine  
 eligibility
Complain to  
     broker
Keep passengers from taking ineligible trips
FIGURE 1 The Structure of Accountability Under 
the Capitated Broker System
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METHODS
To assess the ability of the new system to hold the
various parties accountable, several types of data
were needed: 1) before and after statistics on costs
and ridership, 2) surveys of transportation users,
and 3) surveys of transportation providers. Rider
assessments of the service after reform are critical.
Presumably, if riders are indeed satisfied with a ser-
vice after reform, the cost savings of that reform did
not come at the expense of quality service.
Our estimate of the reduction of fraud or waste is
necessarily indirect. Clearly, reform has the poten-
tial to reduce the income of some providers more
than others. Presumably, the brokers will shift busi-
ness to the more efficient providers when assigning
riders. The inefficiencies of the old system may be
most likely among for-profit providers who special-
ized in Medicaid transportation and were quite
small. If this was the case, we would expect to find
that, under the new system, brokers shift riders to
the larger providers, especially those providers that
can cluster rides. 
Financial, Mileage, and Usage Data
Financial, mileage, and usage data were examined
in order to compare conditions before and after
implementation of the HSTDP broker system. Data
representing “before” conditions were obtained
from the Kentucky Cabinet of Health Services. For
each month in federal fiscal year 1997 (October
1996–September 1997) and for each county, infor-
mation was provided on the total miles of service,
the number of trips, and the total amount of pay-
ment for Medicaid transportation. This period was
selected because it was the last full federal fiscal year
before onset of the reform. Individual county data
were then aggregated into totals based on the new
regions under control of a broker. Fiscal year totals
and monthly averages of miles, trips, and payments
were summarized and average monthly cost-per-
trip, cost-per-mile, and miles-per-trip indices were
calculated for each region. 
Data representing “after” conditions were
obtained from the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet
(KYTC). In order to assess the actual changes experi-
enced in the various indices of efficiency of perfor-
mance, broker data for 1999 were compared with
the comparable calendar months of federal fiscal year
1997. For each broker region, data were provided on
the amount paid to the broker by KYTC, the aggre-
gate amount paid to subcontractors by the broker,
total Medicaid transportation trips provided within
the region, and the total miles for these trips.
User Survey
The Urban Studies Institute at the University of Lou-
isville, with the assistance of the University of Ken-
tucky Transportation Center, developed a telephone
questionnaire of approximately 100 questions. The
survey instrument probed the experiences of Medic-
aid transportation clients with the services they
received before and after the start of the HSTDP. Sur-
vey participants were queried about their frequency
of usage of HSTDP transportation services, the type
of vehicle on which they are most often a passenger,
and their judgment of the transportation service in
terms of driver helpfulness and courtesy; trip safety,
timeliness, and dependability; and vehicle cleanliness,
comfort, and maintenance. 
The broker in each of the 15 participating
HSTDP regions supplied current lists of persons eli-
gible for Medicaid transportation service in that
region. Where telephone numbers were not included
on the lists, survey researchers at University of Lou-
isville attempted to find them using various tech-
niques. Next, the researchers randomly called users.
In order to obtain approximately 100 completed
surveys in each HSTDP region, the interviewers had
to place two telephone calls for each completed sur-
vey. Unfortunately, the University of Louisville Sur-
vey Research Center did not compute a true
response rate, because many of those calls were sec-
ond calls to the same phone number. Thus, the true
response rate, though unknown, was greater than
50 percent. Since we are concerned with before and
after comparisons across the entire state, we did not
adjust the sample for population size within regions.
Provider Survey
We sent a written survey to all the providers in the
state. Some were small, private sector companies,
some were nonprofits, and some were brokers who
also provided transportation. Since most of the pro-
viders were active in the previous system, the survey
instrument was designed to elicit assessments of
change. Specifically, we wanted to see if the providers
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were adding passengers on each run. We also wanted
to see if the brokers were referring riders to the small
companies, especially those without vans and buses.
We also asked about assessments of the fairness of
the brokers’ allocation of rides. Of 160 providers,
102 returned useable surveys. The taxi companies
were less likely to return a questionnaire—58% ver-
sus 69% of the other providers. The variables from
the provider survey and their wording are in table 1.
FINDINGS
Accountability for Costs
Did the new HSTDP capitated broker program cut
costs? The answer is an unequivocal yes. The before
and after comparisons summarized in table 2 show
that even though the average number of monthly
trips (i.e., the number of passengers conveyed) rose
to 94,615 from 59,904, an increase of almost 58%
in just 2 years, the average monthly mileage went
from 1,464,516 to 1,180,189, a decrease of 19.4%.
The average trip per passenger carried dropped
from 24.5 miles to 12.5 miles.
Table 2 also shows a marked decline in the
amount paid per trip, from $29.03 to $23.86, a
decrease in average cost of 17.8%. This, of course,
is proportionately less than the decline in mileage
per trip. One reason for this is the costs associated
with running the broker service. We estimate that
the statewide administrative cost of a typical broker
operation is $4.34 per trip, or approximately 18%
of the total cost per trip. A rise in the number of
trips was expected for several reasons: 1) prior to
the broker program, 12 of the 120 counties in Ken-
tucky had no transportation service, 2) the new pro-
gram was heavily advertised by the state, 3) demand
for Medicaid service was rising throughout the
1990s, and 4) the implementation of the program
coincided with the imposition of work requirements
under welfare reform.
How were costs reduced? There are several possi-
bilities. One is trip grouping. This can be inferred
when data show changes in miles-per-trip, which
was the case as mentioned at the beginning of this
section. Trip grouping can also be inferred from the
type of vehicle in which the survey respondent usu-
ally travels while receiving Medicaid transportation
service (car, taxi, 7 to 15 passenger van, or bus).
Table 3 shows a reduction in the use of automobiles
for Medicaid transportation service and an increase
in the use of vans and buses—a finding in line with
greater trip grouping. We put taxis and autos in one
category and buses and vans in the other to create a
2 by 2 contingency table. The shift from taxis and
autos to vans and buses after the onset of the broker
program is statistically significant (Chi-square =
6.55, d.f. 1, p < .05).  
TABLE 1  Variables and Related Questions from 
the Provider Survey
Group trips. “I have been able to group trips effectively with the 
new broker system.” Strongly agree = 5; agree = 4; neutral = 3; 
disagree = 2; strongly disagree = 1.
Quality. “The overall quality of service I provide to my Medicaid 
riders has improved under the new system.” Strongly
agree = 5; agree = 4; neutral = 3; disagree = 2; strongly 
disagree = 1.
Brokers are fair. “The broker has a fair procedure for 
allocating trips among all the providers in my region.” 
Strongly agree = 5; agree = 4; neutral = 3; disagree = 2; 
strongly disagree = 1.
More second riders. “My organization’s average number of 
second passengers (of all kinds) per trip under the broker 
system has:” increased = 3; remained the same = 2; 
decreased = 1.
Revenue change. “My organization’s revenue for Medicaid 
transportation services under the broker system has:” 
increased = 3; remained the same = 2; decreased = 1.
Share of trips are Medicaid. “What share of your trips is for 
Medicaid?” Nearly all = 4; three-fourths = 3; one-half = 2; 
one-fourth or less = 1.
Companies with vans and buses. All companies with vans or 
buses were coded 1; all others were coded 0.*
Small taxi companies with no vans and buses. All providers 
with 10 or fewer cabs and no vans or buses were coded 1; 
all others were coded 0.*
*The two variables about organization type and size were based on 
responses to this question: “How many of each type of vehicle do 
you have: buses, taxis, minivans, and other?” 
TABLE 2  Comparison of Monthly Financial Mileage Data Before and After the 
Start of the New HSTDP (Broker) Program
FY97 (before) FY99 (after) % change
$ paid per trip $29.03 $23.86 –17.8
Number of trips 59,904 94,615 57.9
Total monthly mileage 1,464,516 1,180,189 –19.4
Average mileage per trip 24.5 12.5 –49.0
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Accountability for Quality
This section addresses the possibility that the
observed reduction in cost per trip was gained at the
expense of user satisfaction. A series of questions in
the telephone survey of Medicaid-eligible individu-
als covered the degree of user satisfaction with the
HSTDP. For comparison with the previous pro-
gram, respondents were also asked to estimate their
level of satisfaction prior to the HSTDP. 
 Table 4 presents the wording of the questions
that concern quality and the percentage of respon-
dents answering “always” or “usually” to them
before and after the start of the broker program.
Survey respondents expressed the highest satisfac-
tion levels with drivers, vehicles, broker representa-
tives, and service punctuality in that order. Table 4
indicates that before and after declines in punctual-
ity of service and broker courtesy, although small,
are statistically significant.
The greatest decline was in punctuality of pickup.
Prior to the HSTDP, 91.5% of the survey respon-
dents reported that they always (or usually) were
picked up on time; now 83.6% say that. This
decline in punctuality could be a consequence of
increased trip grouping.
The key question then is this: are riders less satis-
fied with the new system? Although the before and
after differences are not great, they are statistically
significant, which suggests a decline in quality of
service. However, when asked if they had had a par-
ticularly bad experience with the old and new sys-
tems, 17 percent of respondents reported a bad
experience when discussing the new system and 18
percent when discussing the old.
Accountability for Efficient Allocation
The decrease in cost per ride suggests that the bro-
kers are allocating rides to the most efficient provid-
ers. Indicators of efficient allocation would be: more
trip grouping, an increase in revenue reported by
providers grouping rides, and a shift toward those
providers with vans and buses in their fleets.
The survey responses of the providers suggest
that all three have been occurring. Thirty-eight per-
cent of the providers say they have increased the
number of second passengers on vehicles. The corre-
lation matrix in table 5 shows that the transit pro-
viders indicating more second passengers per vehicle
are more likely to report they are receiving increased
revenues from Medicaid (r = .37, p < .01). Medicaid
revenues are also shown to have increased for those
TABLE 3  Type of Vehicle Used for Medicaid 
Transportation
Vehicle type Before HSTDP After HSTDP
Car 18.3% 10.6%
Taxi 35.1% 37.3%
Van 35.7% 40.7%
Bus 10.2% 10.9%
Did not recall 0.7% 0.4%
n = 1,036
Note: Columns do not necessarily sum to 100% due to rounding.
TABLE 4  User Satisfaction Before and After the Start of the New HSTDP Program 
(Percentage responding “Always” or “Usually”)
Question Before After % change
Significance 
level
Are the broker representatives 
helpful when you call?
90.8 87.8 –3.0 p <.05
Are the broker representatives 
courteous when you call?
92.3 88.9 –3.4 p <.01
Are you picked up on time? 91.5 83.6 –7.9 p <.01
Do you get to where you need to
go on time?
93.4 90.0 –3.4 p <.01
Are the drivers helpful? 93.1 93.0 –0.1 NS
Are the drivers courteous? 93.9 93.7 –0.2 NS
Do they drive safely? 94.8 94.5 –0.3 NS
Is the vehicle clean? 93.4 92.8 –0.6 NS
Is the vehicle comfortable? 92.8 94.2 1.4 NS
Does the vehicle seem to be well 
maintained?
92.7 93.8 1.1 NS
n = 1,036
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who report they have been able to group trips effec-
tively (r = .45, p < .01). As expected, the companies
with vans and buses in their fleets are more likely to
report an increase in second riders (r = .37, p < .01).
However, the relationship between having large
vehicles and revenue change is not significant. Simi-
larly, small taxi companies (those with 10 or fewer
vehicles and no vans and buses) are not more likely
than the other providers to report a decrease in
Medicaid revenues. However, the correlation
between small taxi companies and adding a second
passenger is negative (r = –.34, p < .01) and small
taxi companies are less likely to report success at
grouping passengers (r = –.28, p < .05). 
The correlation between small companies and
reliance on Medicaid for passengers (r = .20,
p < .05) implies that small taxi companies without
vans and buses will lose Medicaid revenue. Yet, the
correlation between change in Medicaid revenue
and small taxi companies is insignificant. 
We also asked about perceptions of the fairness
of allocation of riders by brokers. Providers with the
greatest dependence on Medicaid were less likely to
see the brokers’ assignments of riders as fair. Those
who said the procedures were fair were likely to say
they could group trips (r = .65, p < .01), had added
second riders (r = .40, p < .01), had increasing Med-
icaid revenue (r = .36, p < .01), and thought the
quality of service had gone up (r = .55, p < .01).
Smaller providers were less likely to say the brokers
were fair (r = –.27, p < .01) but not more likely to
see service quality as having declined.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The reform appears to be successful. Despite the rise
in the number of riders, there has been a decrease in
total mileage, which seems to be due in part to a sig-
nificant increase in trip grouping. Overall, the unit
cost per trip dropped 18% and the length of the
average trip went down. Kentucky’s reform has pro-
duced a true rarity in government—an increase in
the quantity of service at lower cost per unit.
Under the new system of accountability, the bro-
ker is in a better position geographically to estimate
the appropriate mileage and to arrange trip group-
ing. As was the case before the broker system, trans-
portation providers are paid by the mile and the
number of passengers. However, now they are
watched more closely to ensure they do not drive
more miles than necessary. The finding that there
has been a 20% drop in the total miles reported
despite the large upsurge in riders is perhaps most
suggestive of less fraud and waste.
The interviews we conducted with the brokers
also support the above speculations. Brokers told us
they were tracking trip length, and they were con-
vinced that providers could no longer claim more
mileage or get paid for trips to unauthorized desti-
nations. A slight increase in the use of vans to trans-
port passengers (with a commensurate decrease in
the number of riders being transported in automo-
biles) is also consistent with the placing of more
than one passenger on many of the transit vehicles.
Because each of the four parties can be sanc-
tioned by one or more of the other parties, the struc-
ture of accountability is seamless. With the ability to
file complaints, Medicaid riders have the power to
sanction. Taken together, the findings imply that
region-based, capitated broker systems can reduce
costs. The implications for improving accountability
in transit seem clear: 1) give brokers a financial
incentive to economize by, for instance, the use of
lump sum capitated payments; 2) facilitate the mon-
TABLE 5  Pearson Correlation Coefficients
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Revenue change
2. More second riders .37**
3. Group trips .45** .37**
4. Share of trips are Medicaid –.10 –.21* –.28*
5. Quality .43** .22* .58** –.35**
6. Small taxi companies and no vans and buses .15 –.34** –.28** .20* –.04
7. Companies with vans and buses .18 .39** .28 –.25 .17 –.38**
8. Brokers are fair .36** .40** .65** –.32** .55** –.27** .36**
*  p < .05
** p < .01
n = 102
O’CONNELL, GROSSARDT, SIRIA, MARCHAND & McDORMAN 81
itoring of providers by keeping the region over
which each broker is responsible of manageable
size; 3) provide all customers with a means to report
poor quality of service to an outside party. The
likely result is more efficiency and less waste with
only a modest decline in rider satisfaction.
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